Naturalizing IntentionalityPHIL 281
About the seminar

This course examines the theories on intentionality and information theory, exploring foundational concepts, the evolution of naturalized intentionality, and the role of informational relations in shaping mental states. It delves into the quantification and transfer of information, emphasizing the significance of causality and the conceptual framework for understanding informational content.

Schedule

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DateTopicReading
Thu1/12Session 1Dretske 1
Thu1/19Session 2Dretske 2
Thu1/26Session 3Dretske 3
Thu2/2Session 4Millikan 1
Thu2/9Session 5Millikan 2
  • Millikan (1984) Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories [pp. 85-126], read Ch 5: “Intentionality as a Natural Phenomenon,” Ch 6: “Intentional Icons: Fregean Sense, Reference, and Real Value Introduced,” and Ch 7: “Kinds of Signs.”
Thu2/16Session 6Millikan 3
  • Millikan (1984) Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories [pp. 127-158, 239-256], read Ch 8: “Hubots, Rumans, and Others: Case Studies of of Intensions, Senses, and ‘Stimulus Meanings’,” Ch 9: “Intension: The Third Aspect of Meaning,” and Ch 15: “The Act of Identifying.”
Thu2/23Session 7Fodor 1
  • Fodor (1990) A Theory of Content [pp. ix-49], read the Introduction, Ch 1: “Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation,” Ch 2: “Semantics, Wisconsin Style.”
Thu3/2Session 8Guest speaker: Susanna Siegel
Thu3/9Session 9Fodor 2
  • Fodor (1990) A Theory of Content [pp. 51-87], read Ch 3: “A Theory of Content I: The Problem.”
Thu3/16Session 10Fodor 3
  • Fodor (1990) A Theory of Content [pp. 89-136], read Ch 4: “A Theory of Content II: The Theory.”